Together, we succeed!

31 May 2004

Dátum: 2004-06-08 15:00:00, eredeti URL: http://archiv.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=24302
KCMDB-be feltöltve: 2024-05-04 20:08:29.539695, Feltöltő: fidesz_hu_scraper_v2

‘God bless the Hungarian,

with high spirits and plenty...'

I. Europe in the world, Hungary in Europe

For Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union (hereinafter Fidesz) and the organisations co-operating with it on the basis of Christian democratic principles, like the Christian Democratic Peoples' Party, Fidelitas, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Alliance, the Smallholders' Civic Association, and Lungo Drom, it is natural that both the individual and people's communities request for the blessing of God when they face some kind of a new, significant change. Members of Fidesz know that they have arisen from Christian culture by way of preserving such values also in a modern Europe. We share Robert Schuman's opinion: ‘Democracy shall either be Christian or shall not be.'

The fundamental theses of Fidesz Hungarian Civic Alliance on the accession in the European Union are incorporated in the polemical essay titled ‘Europe is our future, Hungary is our homeland', published at the end of 2002. Its statements are also valid in the months directly preceding the accession in 2004. Although these theses have not changed, in this period of more than a year some new courses of events, processes have also taken place in the world, the European Union and in the domestic political and economic fields of Hungary.

It is one of the unchanged, fundamental theses that Hungary is not a new member of modern Europe. For more than a thousand years - for a period of time that has been longer than in the case of many current member states of the EU - we have been a member of and contributor to creating and shaping a modern Europe. Our participation was interrupted - not due to our own free determination - by pacts that followed World War II, which excluded us for more than four decades from modern Europe, obliging Hungary to belong to the Soviet sphere of interests, to the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact.

This uprooting happened against our will and was artificial, because it broke a centuries' long organic development. At the same time its consequence was a reality, so difficult to change and lasting for long. As a consequence of ‘staying away' for four decades, the economic development of Hungary was lagging behind not only that of the developed West but also those in several countries of Southern Europe. Not only the dimensions of the (national) economy but its internal structure, its relationship with and links to the external economic areas of the world and those of Europe were also deformed. It followed from all the above that Hungary - although after the fall of communism and as a consequence of rapid liberalisation and opening up she re-established her powerful ties to the West - has proven unable to close the gap of economic development of several decades.

This factor only confirms the validity of the fundamental thesis that weak, powerless countries can easily be at a disadvantage while strong, powerful ones can gain new strength and value added from integration. In light of all the above, it is indispensable that our country should have a firm and well elaborated vision on the future of Europe, about the tasks and the mission to be fulfilled: what is the judgement that we form on the future of European integration and in what direction we wish to influence the development of this process. This has a major significance also because in the Union, for the first time in history, a true constitutional process is underway. In other words we do not accede to a Europe that is ready, complete, but we may contribute to the construction of the European Union of the 21st century.

It is our priority obligation to have our national interests observed - this needs to be stated as our initial point. The European Union is not a social institution where in the veins of helpless Governments life-giving subsidies are dripping by an infusion in order to maintain the blood circulation of their economies. Hungary has to represent her own position continuously and consistently and has to strive so that the development of the Union should proceed in a direction that is favourable for her. The European Union cannot become an economic association where the shareholders are eligible for a dividend in proportion to their share of the registered capital. When the aims of the Union are set and choosing the means to be used, solidarity among nations should be decisive.

While focusing at Hungarian interests related to the development of European integration in the future, it would be a mistake if references were exclusively given to some Hungarian aspects when representing the vision for the world outside. It is natural that for all member states their own interests are decisive. However, every member state is striving - case by case with comparative success - to represent them as interests of the Union as a whole. Once we have a clear vision of Europe, we also have the definitions of the focal points of our operation as a member state, in other words we have defined the mission of Hungary in the EU.

1. Our vision of Europe

1.1 Europe - the community of communities

The first issue is taking a position regarding the classical controversy or competition between ‘Europe above nations' and ‘Europe of nations'. It is our initial consideration that we have to step beyond the scope of this controversy, we have to rise above this debate. Two points for a breakout offer themselves here. One of them is to strengthen regionalism, the structure of local self-governments, the other one is to recognise and accommodate the communities of people that in cases are not tied to a given area (like those of national minorities). If we connect these two theorems equally based on the principle of subsidiarity, then to a greater extent we have to recognise local and community autonomies, local self-governments that will have to play a decisive role in shaping the future of Europe.

‘Europe above nations' would mean that a European United States would be created where the majority of decisions would be made far away from the people and their communities. For this reason, Fidesz rejects this notion. It is not above the member states where the Union has to be formed, rather more the Union has to provide for the efficient co-operation of the member states. The ‘Europe of nations' concept on the other hand cannot be endorsed not only because in this case the term ‘nation' is inaccurate (it indicates only the political nation), but also because those who represent this concept have as a starting point the fiction of a homogeneous nation state by tradition. The rejection of this fiction as well as the enhanced recognition of decentralisation, subsidiarity and self-governance have been the most important conditions for the success of European integration so far, and shall also be in the future. The definition ‘community of communities' means that the concept of a homogeneous nation state is refused since it refers to both the (above mentioned) components of subsidiarity, that is to the strengthening of local self-governments and the enhanced recognition of communities that are independent from regions. In the 21st century the frames of member states are in many respects no longer sufficient so that all the citizens of Europe could live in security and welfare. It is for this reason that the scopes of authority that stay with the institutions of the Union should be enhanced, however, strictly in the areas where community action is more efficient compared to that of a nation or than taking a stand on a level that is lower than that of a nation. The ways for practicing the competences of the Union should by all means be transparent, responsible and democratic. Consequently, in the decision-making of the Union the role of Parliaments must not be emptied, as they are the principal representatives of sovereignty. In the institutional triangle of the Union the European Parliament and the Council have to co-operate efficiently in order to avoid even the appearance or pretence that decisions are made above the heads of citizens. The Governments of all member states have to assure (on the other hand) that before defining their positions in the Council, the opinions of their national bodies of legislation are taken into account.

In a peculiar way this development is not hindered by the global processes; they help it, instead. All the above depends on the condition that in the European Union local and community self-determination, self-governance should be implemented instead of a homogeneous, centralised system. Thereby the identity of communities and national communities as well as national minorities would not weaken, rather more it would strengthen, consequently the multi-colour character, which is the pledge and the essence of European development, would be maintained.

1.2 Instead of multi-speed, equality in rank

What position we take regarding the issue of a two or multi-speed Europe is the other essential question. First of all, some clarification has to be given on the concepts. The two-speed Europe is also a present reality (for example Denmark and the United Kingdom are not members of either the EMU or the zone covered by the Schengen Agreement), however even despite these ‘opt outs', chosen in a free manner, we cannot speak about a final state of affairs. Therefore the term ‘speed' is correct, because the finality is shared by the member states although they achieve it at different points of time. There is no particular problem regarding ‘enhanced co-operation' either, as in a particular case it can even give an impetus to the integration process, supposing that it complies with certain fundamental criteria (openness, assisting those who opted out to catch up), and concerns only some specific questions. The concept of ‘hard core', however, may mean a fundamental problem and that those who raise the idea of a two or multi-speed Europe today essentially have this in their minds. Creating it cannot be in the Hungarian interest, as certainly for at least one or two decades, despite all her repeated promises and political declarations, Hungary cannot qualify to belong to the more developed, hard core of integration, either from the economic-financial or the legal institutional, or even from the defence capabilities aspects. Creating a ‘Europe of concentric circles' cannot be a European interest either, because, unavoidably, it would trigger off disintegration, the strengthening of internal processes of disintegration, which would finally drift the process of unification itself in extreme danger. All the above can clearly and honestly be stated also today, and we must not take seriously the siren-voices speaking about possible involvement in the ‘hard core'.

The idea of a multi-speed Europe is also dangerous for us. In a historic moment, in the moment of the Continent's reunification, it communicates a false message to the European public opinion: ten countries join, therefore the European structures have to be transformed, because the ‘new ones' pry them apart. From here it is easy to get to the conclusion that in the forthcoming decades the countries acceding now would be identified as the source of the Union's problems. If we change the gears for different speeds, the labels ‘them' and ‘us', ‘old ones' and ‘new ones' shall be maintained for long.

For Fidesz stability is the most decisive value of the European Union. Its pillars are as follows: 1. its decisions are democratic, which strengthens democracy itself 2. it is balanced in its external relations and via its system of economic regulations 3. it strives for political unity. For this reason, the European Union for us is the reality that can be grasped in its moral unity. It is on this note that we assume severe burdens, this is why we request for help to bridge over our difficulties, and it is for this reason that any kind of a new division in Europe would be intolerable for us, should it be along the categories of old and new, them and us, slower and quicker, or poor and prosperous.

1.3 Shared scopes of authority only for enhancing the representation of national interests

It has a decisive practical significance from the aspect of some processes in the future what scopes of authority will be shared with either the member states or the institutions of the Union, and how we shall exercise the scopes of authority of the Community (unanimity or qualified majority).

There is no need to give a general answer to this question in this programme of Fidesz. The Hungarian interest can only be identified with respect to a specific area or regarding a group of questions, consequently it always has to be represented with respect to an individual area or issue of concern. (Today for instance we do not agree with the issue of tax collection being transferred to the category of decisions passed by qualified majority voting, but that may change in a few years.) Shared scopes of authority and the issue of decision-making by qualified majority are specific, and not general theoretical issues, the essential is that the Hungarian interests should be recognised, defined and represented firmly.

1.4 New opportunities for our foreign and national policy

Defining our concept of Europe also includes positioning the European Union on the map of the world from a foreign policy perspective, and to consider whether there is a need for redefining the Hungarian system of foreign relations and Hungary's so-called nation policy.

The former economic giant, the European Communities (widely known as the Common Market), as a result of its own internal development, has become a political factor under the name European Union by now. This was also coupled with a strengthening role in its security policy and even in its defence policy. As such, it is unavoidable and not to be considered a source of problems. However, since the transatlantic link from the Hungarian perspective is strong and is not to be challenged, the need is to support those kinds of mechanisms for reconciliation and organisation where the direction of activities can be clearly defined and where neither the capabilities, nor the structures are duplicated. At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that the EU will also build up its own defence capabilities: should it wish to take an autonomous position, after consulting with the NATO, even without (using) NATO capabilities, it should be able to proceed accordingly. It is in the interest of Hungary that NATO should continue to fulfil the role played in global security.

In the always wider choice of instruments for crisis management and prevention at the disposal of the Common European Foreign Policy (provision and withdrawal of aid, sanctions in commercial policy, co-ordination of visa and entry policy, etc.) it is of outstanding importance for Hungarian foreign policy that the European Union should first of all have a firm and effective presence in its neighbourhood and its attention should not be diverted by the accentuated management of former colonies in its external relations. In other words, the Union should accommodate, incorporate the problems of the new member states, our priorities should also become like those of the Union. We need to find allies for this policy. Our tasks are multifold. First, we have to communicate the events on the Balkans and in Ukraine toward the Union credibly, and we need to be instrumental in avoiding that the Union should treat these countries as one single block. Second, we have to do everything possible so that the accession of Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania should take place as a direct follow-up of the current enlargement, after having applied the same comprehensive system of criteria in place so far.

Beside raising the awareness of our priorities, we also need to show a receptive attitude to the sensitivity of others. In the case of the Union it means that we need to recognise what significance the Mediterranean region has from the aspect of the future of Europe. Beyond understanding the problems there, we also need to elaborate our own policy for maintaining contacts with the countries of the Mediterranean.

In the interest of our security and endurance we have to strive to achieve that the Union should continue to share the financial burden we need to assume for the protection of our external borders also after we have joined the Schengen System. In other words, the Union should show its solidarity with us also in this respect.

From the nation policy aspect it has to be underlined first that the accession in the European Union is one of the instruments of national reunification. As of 1 May, instead of 10 million Hungarian citizens, approximately 10.8 million Hungarians shall become the citizens of the Union, and when Romania accedes, this number will grow to 12.4 million. The Hungarian language becomes the official language of the Union, the single market and the Community funds allocated for cross-border co-operation along the internal borders shall open opportunities never seen so far for Hungarian entrepreneurs who live in the different countries, in front of whom administrative hurdles and customs borders have been piling up before.

As a result of accession, the establishment of common formal and informal Hungarian institutions also becomes possible in the Union, to serve as fora of co-operation for the Hungarian organisations active in the member states. The already existing co-operation among the groups of Hungarian representatives of the EPP or opening the representative office for lobbying in Brussels of the Hungarians who live beyond our borders can be examples of the above. In such a way we shall be able to have an organised representation for issues such as the rights of minorities, the recognition and codification of the autonomy of communities and will also be able to keep these issues on the agenda. Within the European Peoples' Party it is particularly worthwhile to insert the autonomy of minority communities in the concept of subsidiarity, by tradition considered as a Christian democratic principle.

What effect emigration, particularly the brain-drain to Hungary, shall exert on Hungarians living in countries that will join the Union only later or which have the perspective of staying outside the EU for a longer run, is a question that needs to be dealt with separately. As a member state of the EU, we have to consider how we intend to foster our relations permanently with some components of the nation that will stay outside the Union - this raises the need for clarification on issues like the exemption from the obligatory visa system, cross-border trade, dual citizenship and the future of the Law on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries.

1.5 Work- and knowledge-based, strong and competitive internal economy

When defining our vision on the future, by all means we need to touch upon the economic aspects, that is the status of both the European and the Hungarian economy, their capabilities for growth and their state of equilibrium.

In Hungary, after being an outcast for four decades, the fall of communism took place in such a way that the country was not able to reinforce her national existence, her role played in the structure of ownership or her internal wealth. From a system of dictatorship led by the Soviet Union Hungary stepped over to the space of her new history in such a way that in reality the country could not become one of hers for a single moment: after the fall of communism, most of the Hungarian internal space for economic activities has been transformed to become international. All these meant and also mean on the one hand that Hungary harmonised herself with the West, Europe and the globalised world rapidly and flexibly, perhaps even too fast.

Harmonisation also took place in the external relations, in the geographical rearrangement of foreign trade, and in the Hungarian internal market as well. While they were present abroad, transnational companies assumed their roles and positions in Hungary, which stimulated harmonisation. Though they gained new grounds in Hungary, powerful Hungarian companies did not show up, there was no significant Hungarian participation in the financial sector. The growth of the domestic small and medium-sized companies is lagging far behind what is desirable. As a result of all these effects, a powerful stratum of entrepreneurs has not emerged in Hungary, although, as it has already been mentioned, to stand the challenges of the integration, to have the internal national interests observed, a powerful internal national space is an indispensable condition.

The strengthening of the internal space came about with a decade's delay, after 1998, it is even better to say after 2000. The Széchenyi Plan was its instrument and the form of its implementation, which accepted and incorporated the accession in the European Union in such a way that it promoted the process of becoming a member state by trying to diminish the extent of our lagging behind.

For Europe and also for Hungary the greatest challenge today is whether she can become competitive. This is closely connected to the questions of whether the Union proves to be capable of carrying out the Lisbon process, and whether Hungary is able to get involved in it. According to the Lisbon strategy approved in March 2000, the European Union has to establish the most competitive, most dynamically developing, knowledge-based economy of the world, coupling a sustainable economic development with the provision of more and better jobs and an enhanced social cohesion.

Currently, prospects for the Hungarian economy are not favourable. The comparative advantages of Hungary in this region such as a better understanding of the market economy, better trained and cheaper workforce, a relatively acceptable infrastructure and the financial services have almost completely been exhausted. So far the texture of the national economy has not been created that would be able to help the country through difficulties even if there is an unfavourable development in the external conditions. The actors of the economy who are the representatives of this type of stability, that is the small and the medium-sized enterprises, have not become stronger to an adequate degree, so that they would be able to cope with the challenge of an intensifying competition. The deterioration of macroeconomic indicators shows clearly that there is a need for a transparent swift in the economic policy.

In this situation the correct answer is as follows: in the light of the Lisbon process, knowledge, work and an enhanced ability to work should be focused at instead of a charity-based approach, while attention should also be directed to creating social cohesion. This means that the State plays a role in areas such as the training of manpower, building a knowledge-based society, helping small and medium-sized enterprises, accelerating major investments in the infrastructure.

We must not overlook the fact that for the ten acceding countries closing the gap shall be like a real ‘regatta' this time, a competition among attractive sites for investments, in which we have clearly been pushed further back. The competition will be decided by knowing which country will be able to muster an innovative economy instead of an ‘extended work-bench'. Adequate infrastructure, for instance wide band internet access, services like telecommunication and IT capabilities, university research sites and State and community administration shall replace the current competition taking place on the grounds of the costs of manpower and subsidies. Hungary may again return to pole position if, besides increasing the necessary costs, a comprehensive policy is conducted that is built on our opportunities and our traditional knowledge , if the private sector is made interested in investments that are built on our abilities, as well as if the necessary investments are made in innovation, research and development, military high-tech research and biotechnological development, that is, if brain-drain is finally reversed for brain-gain.

Should we be able to go beyond the competition for investments, in the initial period of our membership in the Union we have a good opportunity to catch up with the leading group of countries in the policies we chose for ourselves. Thus the Lisbon process is one where our potentials are good, therefore we have good chances for speeding up procedures of closing the gap by our deliberate economic and social policies. Whether we shall be successful in this area will determine the status of Hungary in Europe for a long time.

The major forthcoming challenge for the Hungarian economy is the introduction of the Euro. For Hungary being a country with a small and open economy, perhaps this is the greatest advantage offered by the Union. Predictability and low inflation that is guaranteed are the best protection against speculation and the reducible reserves of foreign exchange represent major opportunities for us. For these reasons, we have to do everything possible for the introduction of the Euro in 2008. To this end, however, we have to enter the exchange rate system ERM II in 2006 at the latest. Though it has a stabilising effect, essentially we shall give up the possibility of conducting an independent exchange rate policy. We can undertake this, but we need to have a national economic policy for this purpose that does not intend to improve competitiveness by devaluation.

In our policy of foreign trade we need to have a more active presence: we should make better use of our geo-political position, that is the role we have assumed in the neighbouring countries, particularly on the Balkans should be intensified.

Having clarified our vision on the future, we have to determine how, by what instruments and methods we wish to shape and influence the development of integration.

2. Instruments and methods

2.1. Observation of national interests - merging reality, flexibility and creativity

The external framework for having national interests observed consist of the system of institutions in the Union on the one hand and the hub of relations among the member states on the other. These two areas are closely connected, and together they provide us a certainly new and rather complicated and complex system of terms and conditions, within which the observation of and reconciliation among the interests of the member states are achieved.

As a consequence of enlargement, the European Union shall be transformed significantly and shall become at the same time the primary agency where the efforts of Hungarian foreign policy, foreign trade and nation policy are implemented. Therefore, we need to have our national interests observed in this new context, in this new arena so that we could become familiar with, learn and adequately use the conditions of this agency, its potentials and the opportunities it can offer. Without any doubt, we face a new situation in Europe, because the co-operation and competition of almost thirty member states shall take place in a continental scale in the future.

A very important factor in the observation of interests in the institutions of the Union is forming and using alliances within the Union. This also raises the question of what kind of a relationship is there between membership in the Union and the existing forms of regional co-operation so far in Central-Eastern Europe. The ten new members shall not constitute a unified ‘block' for the long term, however it needs to be seen that at least till the time when equal treatment is achieved (that is for a few years to go) the interests of the ten new member states and particularly the eight states of Central and Eastern Europe shall converge considerably. For, as it has already been mentioned, accession criteria do not incorporate (at least until the end of 2006) the enforcement of the equality-principle neither regarding the shares from the Structural or the Cohesion Funds, nor with respect to the direct subsidies for agriculture (in this latter field the discrimination will be maintained also after 2006), and the same goes to many other fields as well (e.g. the possibility of using safe-guard clauses and discrimination in the free movement of labour). There are further requirements for the attainment of full-fledged membership, more specifically joining the Schengen Zone and the introduction of the Euro. As long as we do not achieve an equal treatment in every area, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe shall be mutually dependent on one another, and this certainly has to be taken into consideration when forming a judgement on maintaining the current forms of co-operation. We have to stand for Visegrád, moreover, we would need to initiate that this co-operation should be adjusted to the new conditions, as well as strengthened and, if needed, also widened in its scope. All the above shall, of course, not exclude the option of forming some other occasional coalitions depending on what is dictated by the national interest with respect to a given issue, in a given moment, and what allies we find for representing those.

After achieving equal treatment, the interests of the ‘ten' will probably undergo a process of differentiation by regions and the time comes for a real and comprehensive integration and accommodation of the new members. Afterwards, coalitions shall indeed be formed on the basis of certain areas and situations; all this requires a very careful and well-considered policy of integration and diplomacy, too.

However, we cannot keep silent about the fact that the numerous problems and issues of Europe at the turn of the millennium also affect the European Union. As a member of the family of European Christian Democracy, Fidesz is convinced that on the long run the future of the Union depends on the effectiveness of the fundamental Christian values. The world of Christian ideas has a growing importance in comparison to disruptive forces.

2.2. Domestic conditions - co-ordination, expertise, rule of law

he development of domestic conditions besides some external ones, plays a decisive role from the aspect of the observation of interests. Its most important factors are as follows:

a) Taking a unified national position on the basis of reconciliation

Regarding the conditions of integration, it is a particularly valid argument that the more united a country seems nationally on the international scene, the more successful it is in having its interests observed. Although the characteristics of integration cannot be considered as those of traditional foreign relations, it is also of major significance that the different political forces should represent a shared position regarding fundamental issues from the aspect of national interests both within the Community institutions and in the relations among the member states. Fidesz proposes dialogue, co-operation and the representation of shared positions in this area. Instead of a continuous contest with the opposition and communicating for party political purposes, the Government should focus on the interests of the country and solving problems. This is particularly true about our presence in the European Parliament - when addressing sectorial policy issues, representing a unified, shared position is indispensable. This is only possible if the deputies elected under the colours of various parties co-operate, and if also the Governments makes all necessary information available for them, i.e. if all the 24 Hungarian representatives in the European Parliament are aware of the position of the Hungarian Government.

It is natural that the opportunity for co-operation among the Hungarian deputies may not mean that Fidesz would approve the proposal, under which there would be a shared list of the Hungarian parliamentary parties for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. This would contradict the fundamental principle of democratic elections for the European Parliament. In other words, co-operation can only come about after the competing parties, values and those who represent them are clearly weighed in the balance in free, democratic elections.

In its nine points, which were published on 20 February 2004, Fidesz identified the areas where it proposes reconciliation to the political forces as soon as possible. Therefore, we should strive for arriving at a consensus on clearly defined themes, and strictly on the basis of representation, the rule of law, democracy and genuine European traditions, instead of having to consider vague, undefined issues that come up clearly against European practices and principles.

b) Authenticity, prestige, expertise

It is closely related to the previous topic, but is not equivalent with it. Expertise, credible technical knowledge can only be acquired by many long years of work, and the new member states have to overcome the lack of confidence and the doubts regarding their technical preparedness so strongly perceivable in the initial period. So far, a rather limited group of people have been dealing with the issues of integration and they have won a significant recognition for the country. If we do not extend this circle in a short time, if we do not multiply the number of experts, we shall not be able to have our interests observed in an authentic and professional manner within the European institutions. If the Government intends to rely exclusively on one part of the country only, it consciously gives up the idea of utilising the nation's full intellectual power. No such advantage must be given to our competitors. Fidesz urges for co-operation also in this area. It would be a tangible sign of this effort if the Government actually agreed with the opposition on the EU-posts (medium- and high-level positions in the EU administration, the head of the EU Representation in Budapest). In such a way, it could be avoided that these posts become political targets. Jobs in the EU administration are effective for a lifetime, whereby selected officials become European civil servants, therefore their candidacy cannot depend on any political regime.

c) Operating domestic institutions on a European level

Our lagging behind compared to the current member states is perhaps the most significant in this area. It is only one component that the establishment and adequate operation of the institutions tasked to absorb the financial support has been deficient. The related problems indicate the drawbacks and the crisis-like situation of institutions and public administration at large. Without a professional and lawful public administration in place, there is no successful integration and observation of interests in Europe.

d) Legal culture, rule of law, democracy

European integration is built on law, it has emerged, developed and been accomplished by the operation of law. The fundamental reason for this is that the basis of the European civilisation is constituted of moral and legal norms that after all are rooted in Christian values. Co-operation between the governing parties and those in opposition is not possible in integration affairs if any of the parties ignore the principles of the rule of law, or else act against the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the laws. The democratic operation of the State administration, power sharing, legal security should be enforced as unavoidable preconditions for representing a shared position in Europe.

A modern European Union perceived as the ‘community of communities' just as the notions of nation and democracy are one another's preconditions. They are in close correlation with one another when developing, moreover, they are accomplished fully in the framework of European unity. This is why interpreting the concept of the nation as a community and democracy are equally needed. This is what we stick to when we want to strengthen Europe and its institutions.

3. Being safe in Europe and in the world

Europe, the European Union mean security for us in the respects of foreign and defence policy, nation policy, in the economic sense and environmental protection as well as legal security. By security, we mean the safety and security of people. The stability of the national economy and sustainable economic growth form important parts of this security concept. The EU institutions already in place and those to be built further with our involvement also belong here: effective protection against terrorism, co-operation in police and justice affairs, safer external borders, common immigration policy, a high level public health system, improvement in the legal protection of citizens, enforcement of consumers' rights, social security. In other words, the economy is on a par with social justice, the issue of social status, reducing the differences among people, the harmony between human beings and their biological environment, but also the inner peace and even-tempered spirit of individuals.

This security concept implies the security of the European Union in the world, together with the security and orderly freedom of the countries, nations, regions, smaller communities, families, individuals in the European Union.

However, this security (also for the European Union) can only be based on the security in our internal conditions, which incorporates legal security, the operation of Hungarian institutions, (its independence at certain points), rational power-sharing, values that can be duly represented, a reliable Hungarian vision of the future, the growth and balance of the national economy. If all the above or some of its elements are upset, or their existence is put in doubt, then this space, more limited or extended it its scope, shall not be reliable for the European Union, either. Internal security shall not be established by the European Union by itself, even though membership has a stabilising effect due to its system of serious criteria for admittance.

The European Union can remain strong only with a powerful internal economy that is capable to form competitive links to European areas and those beyond, with countries that have strong social and internal cohesion. This is also the way for the EU to become more powerful. In such a Europe, families, citizens, regions, member states can be interconnected, can supplement and build one another , and this is how the community shall be comprehensive, self-sustaining and capable of development. It is an irrevocable fact that only the internal cohesion of the nations can be the basis of cohesion in Europe, the basis for the strength of Europe in the world, the foundation for the positions of the countries in Europe, and the position of European values in the member states.

Budapest, May 2004